Zusammenfassung / Summary
A theology which wants to keep the hope for reconciliation up with regard to Auschwitz must, for the sake of justice, assume an intersubjective dimension of the eschatological court in which the complaints of the victims are voiced without accusing God as the creator of the whole. Since, that way, one would hastily transfer the responsibility of the perpetrators for the atrocities they committed to a higher authority. The question of the possibility of an interpersonal forgiveness of something that cannot be forgiven, as discussed by Jankélévitch, Arendt, Derrida and Ricoeur, would thus go unnoticed. However, even if the capability of the good and the bad (Schelling), which is given to human beings alone, enables them to express their forgiveness for the perpetrators, which is a very extreme act, this forgiveness will, with regard to the oppressive history of guilt, only be possible by means of the solidarity of the crucified and resurrected Christ with the victims.